Roy Kitchener Forth

On February 3, 1944, Roy was part of the eight-member crew of Canso "A" 9781, which carried the ID code "Mike". In some records, the aircraft was referred to by its number and in other records it was referred to as the Canso Mike. The aircraft had departed just after 1:30 in the afternoon of February 3 on convoy duty south of Newfoundland and was returning to base, after having successfully escorted the convoy, when it encountered bad weather. The radio only worked intermittently, and it was impossible for the navigator to determine the exact location of the aircraft. The aircraft had continuously been asking for bearings, but its messages were not being received.

At about 4:20 a.m. on February 4, Charlottetown heard the aircraft asking for bearings. Shortly after that, after 16.5 hours of flying, the aircraft was successfully brought down by the pilot, W. E. McNicholl, in an ice floe. Soon after landing, the crew was able to re-establish contact with the base and let them know that they had "Lost balloon and kite". This meant their portable radio was useless. Unfortunately, the crew of Canso Mike didn't know where they were! It was thought the aircraft had landed in the Gulf of St. Lawrence near Dead Man's Island, Magdalene Islands. Two separate rescue planes were dispatched, but neither could locate the downed aircraft. It was determined that the bearings were faulty and a new set of bearings was created which indicated that the aircraft was 100 miles east of Cartwright, Labrador. H.M.C.S. Annapolis was issued orders to set sail for the downed plane.

Although no aircraft were sent out on February 7, due to bad weather in the area of the stranded men, air and sea search operations continued until February 13, 1942. 

An inquiry into the accident was held February 4, 1944. After reviewing all the testimony, Air Marshall Robert Leckie concluded, (a) "That the primary cause of the whole affair was bad navigation. The recommendation for better radio compasses is noted, and it is fully agreed that we must take all possible steps to supply these and any other improved navigational aids; but it is not considered that the shortcomings of the present radio compasses caused this accident. Under the apparently bad wireless conditions at the time, it seems doubtful whether any radio compass would have saved the situation; and a well calculated D.R. course should have brought the aircraft close enough to home to make use of all short-range navigational aids. Even with changing winds, no aircraft with a starting point S.E. of Newfoundland and heading for Gander, should end by landing far out into the Atlantic off the coast of Labrador."

Leckie further noted that (b) there was some confusion in the management of the search and that (c) inadequate steps were taken to bring the surface vessels to the site of the downed aircraft.

There is some confusion for me as to how the final report for Section (d) should read. There appear to be two almost identical reports made by Robert Leckie, one which seems to be dated April 3, 1944, and one which seems to be dated April 8, 1944. In the former, Leckie reported that the decision to land a rescue aircraft should have rested on the shoulders of the pilot who was at the scene, not headquarters, as the pilot had the best knowledge of whether or not the landing could be made safely. He also remarked that for the sake of morale it was "better for crews to feel that if they were in peril, bold efforts will be made to save them." However, in the second report, Leckie reported that "your decision not to allow the captain of Canso "K" (sic) to land is supported." The only difference between the two reports is Section (d). It appears that Leckie wrote two different versions of the report which come to two different conclusions. 

In Section (e) Leckie wrote that a "Gibson Girl" radio should likely have been sent to the men in the event that they had to ditch the Canso and take to the dinghies - which they eventually did! They then had no radio contact at all.

Leckie concluded his report by saying that (f) "It is not thought that the investigation was well conducted." Nonetheless, he believed that the correct facts had been unearthed and it was upon those facts that he had based his comments.

The problems with the investigation centred around the order, or perhaps the lack of logical order, of the testimony of the witnesses and also the fact that the Investigating Officer used too many leading questions when interrogating the witnesses. There seems to have been a disagreement among the ranks as to whether or not the Canso "A" 9772 should have been allowed to land. In the end, it was the considered opinion of the Air Force that the Eastern Air Command functioned well and that loss of the crew of the Canso Mike was a matter of extreme misfortune. Perhaps Robert Leckie's second report then became the official version. It is indeed the one he signed.

(Many thanks to Dennis Burke of www.ww2irishaviation.com  for links he provided to the Operations Record Book and 

Aircraft Accident Investigation Files and for his help in "getting the story right".)